GR 27169; (October, 1977) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-27169 October 20, 1977
PURITA S. AGUILON, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, IGNACIO S. AGUILON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MONTANO BOHOL, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Purita S. Aguilon filed a complaint for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) against Montano Bohol in the Court of First Instance of Davao. Aguilon alleged she had cleared, cultivated, and improved the disputed parcel of public land after the war, paid realty taxes, and filed a homestead application. She claimed Bohol, through his son-in-law, usurped a portion in 1957. A prior forcible entry case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, citing the Director of Lands. Bohol, in his answer, asserted occupation since 1951, pleaded prescription, and challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing the land, being public domain, was under the Director of Lands’ control.
After pre-trial, the lower court, upon Bohol’s motion, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that since both parties’ rights were pending determination by the Director of Lands regarding Aguilon’s homestead application and Bohol’s protest, it could not adjudicate the possessory issue. Aguilon appealed, arguing the court retained jurisdiction over possessory actions.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to adjudicate the possessory rights (accion publiciana) over a parcel of public land for which a homestead application is pending before the Director of Lands.
RULING
Yes, the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that an accion publiciana is a plenary action to determine the better right of possession independently of title, over which Courts of First Instance have original jurisdiction. The pendency of a homestead application and a protest before the Director of Lands does not divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions.
The legal logic is twofold. First, a bona fide homestead applicant in possession acquires a prior possessory right, which is a property right that the courts are duty-bound to protect under Article 539 of the Civil Code. This possessory right exists prior to and separate from the administrative grant of title. Second, the authority of the Director of Lands over the disposition of public lands is not exclusive of the courts’ jurisdiction to settle possessory conflicts. To hold otherwise would leave a lawful possessor without a speedy judicial remedy against usurpation, as administrative proceedings can be protracted. The Court cited precedents like Pitargue vs. Sorilla and Bohayang vs. Maceren, which established that a homestead applicant’s prior possessory right can be vindicated through a forcible entry action or an accion publiciana. The trial court’s dismissal was therefore a reversible error.