G.R. No. L-26950 July 13, 1973
MIGUEL MENDIOLA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. RICARDO TANCINCO as District Engineer of Samar, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

This case originated from a complaint for quo warranto with mandamus filed by numerous plaintiffs, originally 126 and later increased, against public officials including the District Engineer of Samar. The plaintiffs alleged they were illegally dismissed from their employment with the Bureau of Public Works on January 15, 1954. The procedural history is protracted, involving multiple amended complaints and a prior Supreme Court ruling that a second complaint was a continuation of a first, thus interrupting the prescriptive period. Ultimately, the trial court directed the filing of a third amended complaint limited to the original plaintiffs and appointed a commission to verify their employment records. The commission’s report, admitted as correct by both parties, formed the basis of the factual findings.
The verified records established that the plaintiffs were employed as foremen or camineros and were separated from service as part of a reorganization plan. Critically, the service records (Exhibits C, C-1, and D series) demonstrated that all plaintiffs held only temporary appointments at the time of their dismissal in 1954. The defendants maintained the separation was lawful, affecting only temporary employees, while permanent appointees were retained. The trial court dismissed the complaint, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

The central issue is whether the dismissal of the plaintiff-appellants from government service was illegal, thereby entitling them to reinstatement and back wages.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, ruling that the dismissals were legal. The Court’s logic rested on the nature of the plaintiffs’ appointments and the applicable law at the time of their separation. The commission’s findings, conceded by the appellants, conclusively proved they were temporary employees. The law governing their removal was Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, which stipulated that temporary employees could continue only for a limited period, not exceeding three months or thirty days from receipt of a certification of eligibles from the Civil Service Commission.
The Court emphasized that a temporary appointment, by its very nature, confers no vested right to the position and can be terminated at any time, with or without cause, by the appointing authority. This principle holds true even if the temporary appointee possesses civil service eligibility. Eligibility alone does not confer permanence; a permanent appointment duly attested by the Civil Service Commission is required. The appellants failed to demonstrate they held permanent appointments. Consequently, their separation pursuant to a reorganization plan that rendered their services unnecessary was a valid exercise of administrative prerogative. The Court found no arbitrariness, as the reorganization affected only temporary personnel, aligning with legal provisions allowing for the efficient management of the public service.