G.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927
ESTATE OF MIGUEL MAMUYAC, FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant, vs. CORNELIO MAMUYAC, et al., opponents-appellees.

DOCTRINE: In a probate proceeding, the proponent bears the burden of proving the due execution and existence of the will. If the original will was last in the possession of the testator and cannot be found after his death, a presumption arises that the testator revoked or destroyed it with animo revocandi. This presumption, while not conclusive, can only be overcome by clear proof that the will was not revoked by the testator. A mere carbon copy is generally not admissible for probate unless it is proven that the original was lost and was not cancelled by the testator.

FACTS

1. Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922.
2. On July 27, 1918, he executed a will. Francisco Gago petitioned for its probate in 1922, but the court denied it upon finding that Mamuyac had executed a new will on April 16, 1919.
3. On February 21, 1925, Gago filed a new petition to probate the 1919 will. The opponents (heirs) opposed, alleging that: (a) the document presented was merely a carbon copy; (b) the original had been cancelled and revoked by the testator in 1920; and (c) it was not his last will.
4. The trial court, after hearing, denied the probate. It found as facts:
* The presented Exhibit A was a carbon copy.
* The original was in the testator’s possession.
* Witness Jose Fenoy (who typed the 1919 will) and Carlos Bejar testified that the testator had cancelled the 1919 will in December 1920. Bejar stated the testator told him he cancelled it because he had sold Bejar a house and lot and needed to make a new will.
* Narcisa Gago (testator’s sister and proponent’s witness) admitted the original could not be found.
* The opponents successfully established that the testator executed another will in 1920 (though this 1920 will itself was not presented).
5. Francisco Gago appealed, arguing the lower court erred in finding the will was revoked and in rejecting the carbon copy.

ISSUE

Did the trial court err in denying the probate of the 1919 will on the grounds that it had been revoked by the testator and that only a carbon copy was presented?

RULING

No, the trial court did not err. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of probate.

The Court applied the following principles:
1. Burden of Proof: The proponent of a will has the burden to prove not only its due execution but also its *existence*. Once execution is proven, the burden shifts to the contestant to prove revocation.
2. Presumption of Revocation: When a will, known to have been in the possession of the testator, cannot be found after his death, the legal presumption is that the testator destroyed or cancelled it with the intention of revoking it. This presumption varies in strength but is never conclusive.
3. Overcoming the Presumption: The presumption can be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator *animo revocandi*. However, in this case, such proof was lacking.
4. Evaluation of Evidence: The Supreme Court found the trial court’s factual conclusions were supported by the evidence. The positive testimonies of Fenoy and Bejar directly established the cancellation in 1920. The inability to find the original after the testator’s death reinforced the conclusion of revocation.
5. Carbon Copies: The Court cautioned that copies of wills should be admitted with great care. A duplicate or carbon copy may be probated only if it is proven that the original was duly executed and was lost, and that such loss did not occur through revocation by the testator. Here, the evidence pointed to revocation, not mere loss.

Therefore, since the proponent failed to overcome the presumption of revocation and did not satisfactorily prove the continued existence of the original 1919 will, the carbon copy was properly denied probate.