G.R. No. 239827 . July 27, 2022
LEONILA PAREDES MONTERO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND AUGUSTIN M. CLORIBEL, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioner Leonila Paredes Montero, upon being elected Mayor of Panglao, Bohol in 2013, appointed four individuals as consultants. Respondent Augustin M. Cloribel filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging these appointments violated the constitutional and statutory one-year prohibition against appointing losing candidates in an immediately preceding election. Cloribel contended the appointees were all losing candidates from the May 2013 polls. He further asserted the supporting Sangguniang Bayan resolutions were passed eight days after the appointments, lacked essential details like job descriptions and funding sources, and that payments were made despite the Commission on Audit noting the absence of required supporting documents and a violation of procurement rules.
In her defense, Montero argued the prohibition did not apply to consultancy services, citing opinions from the Department of the Interior and Local Government. She claimed reliance on the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions, which she presumed valid, and asserted her actions were within her duty to propose legislative measures. She also highlighted that the Municipality received a Seal of Good Housekeeping. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Montero for four counts each of Unlawful Appointments under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict Montero for the said offenses.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman. The Court clarified that a writ of certiorari is only warranted when the Ombudsman’s action is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, meaning a capricious, whimsical, or despotic exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause, which merely requires a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty, is generally not reviewable by the Court absent such abuse.
The Court held the Ombudsman did not act capriciously. Its finding was based on substantial evidence, including the admission that the appointees were losing candidates, the retroactive nature of the authorizing resolutions, and the Commission on Audit’s adverse findings regarding the legality of the appointments and the lack of supporting documentation for payments. The Ombudsman correctly applied the law, as the one-year appointment ban is absolute and covers any position in the government, including contractual or consultancy roles, as established in Civil Service Commission v. Belagan. Montero’s defense of good faith and reliance on the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions pertains to matters of evidence best ventilated in a full trial, not in a probable cause determination. The Ombudsman’s conclusion that the elements of the crimes might exist was a rational assessment of the submitted facts and law, not an arbitrary or despotic act. Therefore, the petition failed to demonstrate the requisite grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.