G.R. No. L-23773-74 December 29, 1967
FRANCISCO PINEDA, ET AL., petitioner, vs. PASTOR DE GUZMAN, Judge, Court of Agrarian Relations, and BEATRIZ D. VDA. DE FELICIANO, respondents

FACTS

Private respondent Beatriz D. Vda. de Feliciano filed two petitions (CAR Cases Nos. 1187 and 1188) before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) to authorize her to mechanize her landholdings and to eject the petitioner-tenants. The CAR, presided by respondent Judge Pastor de Guzman, rendered a decision on February 1, 1964, in favor of Feliciano, authorizing the ejectment of the tenants. The decision became final and executory in March 1964. On September 3, 1964, Feliciano moved for execution. The tenants opposed, arguing, among other grounds, that under Section 50(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 , as amended, the execution of a dispossession order on the ground of mechanization should not be enforced until one year from the finality of the decision if the tenant is not willing to be resettled. The respondent Judge granted the motion for execution on October 7, 1964. The tenants filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the execution order.

ISSUE

Whether execution of the CAR decision dispossessing the tenants may issue immediately after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, under Section 1, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, or whether it must abide by the one-year waiting period prescribed in Section 50(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 , as amended.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The provision in Section 50(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 , as amended, which states that “in case any dispossessed tenant is not willing to be resettled, his possession (dispossession) shall not be enforced until the lapse of one year from the date the decision becomes final,” is substantive in character. It was not abrogated by the enactment of the Revised Rules of Court, as the rule-making power of the Supreme Court cannot diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Furthermore, under Section 168 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code ( Republic Act No. 3844 ), pending cases for mechanization, like the ones at bar, are to be decided in accordance with Republic Act No. 1199 , as amended. Therefore, the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering execution in disregard of the mandatory one-year waiting period. The execution order dated October 7, 1964, was set aside. However, since the one-year period from the finality of the decision had already elapsed by the time of the Supreme Court’s decision, the issuance of a permanent injunction had become functus officio.