G.R. No. L-23600 and L-23631 January 30, 1970.
CASTOR AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. ERNESTO TAN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. VICENTE RIVERA, JR., in his capacity as Director of Civil Aviation, petitioner, vs. ERNESTO TAN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

The cases originated from Civil Case No. 2190-P in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where Ernesto Tan sought mandamus to compel defendants to allow him to resume porterage service at the Manila International Airport. The trial court dismissed Tan’s suit and dissolved the preliminary injunction. Tan appealed. Meanwhile, the trial court denied Tan’s motion to maintain the status quo and ordered him to cease operating the porterage service. Castor Aguilar was subsequently placed in charge of the service. Tan then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On June 16, 1964, without notice to Aguilar or the Director of Civil Aviation (petitioners), the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting Tan’s petition, ordering the trial court to give due course to Tan’s appeal and desist from enforcing its order, and directing the Civil Aeronautics Administration or Aguilar to desist from interfering with Tan’s operation. Petitioners moved to set aside this decision for lack of notice and jurisdiction. On June 27, 1964, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution holding its June 16 decision in abeyance, ordering petitioners to answer, and suspending trial court proceedings. Petitioners filed separate petitions for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which were dismissed as premature. Petitioners then filed their answers in the Court of Appeals. After hearing, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution on September 21, 1964, incorporating its June 16 decision. Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals’ June 16, 1964 decision was void for lack of due process due to absence of notice to petitioners.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in enjoining the trial court from enforcing its decision dissolving the preliminary injunction pending appeal.

RULING

1. No. While the June 16, 1964 decision was initially rendered without notice to petitioners, the subsequent proceedings cured the defect. Petitioners complained and moved to set aside the decision. The Court of Appeals, in its June 27, 1964 resolution, held the decision in abeyance, ordered petitioners to answer, and summons were served. Petitioners filed answers and were heard on the merits. The rule is that what the law prohibits is the absolute absence of notice and lack of opportunity to be heard. Here, petitioners were subsequently given a full chance to be heard, thus satisfying due process requirements.
2. Yes. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion. The established rule is that an appeal does not stay the execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary injunction. The trial court, in its decision and orders, found that Tan had not acquired any right under the bidding and that the officials setting it aside did not act arbitrarily. The trial court’s order dissolving the injunction, made after a full consideration of the facts, carries a strong presumption of correctness. The Court of Appeals’ reasoning for granting the writs—to preserve the status quo pending appeal—did not demonstrate that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Errors of judgment are reviewable by appeal, not by certiorari. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court warranting the appellate court’s supervisory intervention.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ June 16, 1964 decision and September 21, 1964 resolution and made permanent the preliminary injunction issued in G.R. No. L-23600. Costs were imposed on respondent Ernesto Tan.