G.R. No. 206438 , July 31, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND HERNANDO B. PEREZ, Respondents.

FACTS

This case involves the interpretation of the right to speedy disposition of cases in relation to preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. The specific procedural history stems from a prior case, People v. Sandiganbayan, where the Supreme Court upheld the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of criminal informations against then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez. The dismissal was based on a finding of inordinate delay, as the preliminary investigation, which included a prior fact-finding phase, spanned from November 2002 until the filing of informations in April 2008. The Court in that case ruled that the fact-finding investigation should not be deemed separate from the preliminary investigation for computing delay.
In this Concurring Opinion, Justice Velasco agrees with the ponencia to deny the petitions but provides a detailed elucidation on the factors for determining inordinate delay. He highlights the absence of a fixed statutory period for the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigations, contrasting it with the specific timelines mandated for the judiciary and the National Prosecution Service under the Department of Justice. The opinion grapples with the need to balance the constitutional duty of the Ombudsman to act promptly with its prerogative to conduct thorough investigations.

ISSUE

Whether the period spent in fact-finding investigations should be included in the computation of delay for determining a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases during preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman.

RULING

Justice Velasco, concurring, clarifies the computation of delay by distinguishing between fact-finding investigations conducted before and after the filing of a formal complaint. The legal logic is that the constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition attaches once a formal complaint is filed, triggering the Ombudsman’s duty to resolve it promptly. Therefore, if a fact-finding investigation occurs after a formal complaint is initiated by a private complainant, the period spent on that investigation must be included in the aggregate computation for determining inordinate delay. The complainant has the burden to submit evidence with the complaint, and subsequent fact-finding by the Ombudsman is part of the official preliminary investigation process.
Conversely, if the fact-finding investigation precedes the filing of a complaint, as in motu proprio investigations initiated by the Ombudsman, that period should be excluded from the computation. The right to speedy disposition does not attach during this case build-up phase where no formal charges exist against an individual. The obligation to resolve promptly arises only upon the filing of a verified complaint. This distinction reconciles prior jurisprudence, such as People v. Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman v. Jurado, and provides a clearer framework. The opinion concludes by urging the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own specific rules prescribing a disposition period for preliminary investigations to provide certainty and avoid perpetual litigation on this issue.