G.R. No. L-20406 December 29, 1966
ENRIQUE R. YU KING, plaintiff and appellee, vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, defendant and appellant.

FACTS

Enrique R. Yu King, engaged in selling gasoline, kerosene, and oil in Zamboanga City, filed an action against the City of Zamboanga. He sought a declaration that City Ordinances Nos. 340, 503, and 672 were void and demanded a refund of P26,779.92 paid as specific or license tax on his sales from November 9, 1950, to December 20, 1955, pursuant to said ordinances. The ordinances imposed taxes per unit on these products. Yu King argued the ordinances were null and void because: (1) Ordinance No. 340 was given retroactive effect; (2) they were enacted as emergency measures without the prior certification of the City Mayor as required by the city charter; and (3) the city lacked the power to impose such a tax under its charter ( Commonwealth Act No. 39 , as amended). The City of Zamboanga defended the ordinances as valid, enacted under its taxing power as provided in its charter and later ratified by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1435 . The City also contended that Yu King did not pay the taxes under protest. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga ruled in favor of Yu King, declaring the ordinances void and ordering the refund. The City appealed.

ISSUE

The main issues were: (1) Whether the City of Zamboanga had the authority to enact the ordinances imposing the tax; and (2) Whether the ordinances were invalid due to the retroactive effect of Ordinance No. 340 and the alleged lack of proper certification as emergency measures.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and dismissed Yu King’s complaint. On the first issue, the Court held that the City of Zamboanga had the authority under Section 14(a) of its charter ( Commonwealth Act No. 39 , as amended) to tax the storage and sale of gasoline, oil, and petroleum products. On the second issue, the Court found no merit in Yu King’s challenges. Regarding the lack of mayoral certification for the emergency measures, the Court placed the burden of proof on Yu King to show the absence of such certification, and in the absence of clear evidence, presumed that official duty had been regularly performed. Concerning the retroactivity of Ordinance No. 340 (effective five days prior to its passage), the Court deemed this insignificant and not a ground to void the ordinance, especially since it was later superseded by other ordinances and the action was filed years later. The Court found it unnecessary to address other issues raised.