G.R. No. 183994 , June 30, 2014.
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner, vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY, Respondent.

FACTS

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, through Elizabeth Uy, filed multiple criminal cases for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against petitioner William Co. On June 9, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) provisionally dismissed the cases in open court due to the absence of Uy and her private counsel. Uy received a copy of the dismissal order on July 2, 2003. On July 2, 2004, Uy filed a Motion to Revive the criminal cases, which the MeTC granted. After the presiding judge inhibited herself, the cases were re-raffled. Co filed a petition challenging the revival before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which was dismissed. Co elevated the matter to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 171096), which dismissed the petition, a dismissal that became final and executory on March 20, 2006. Before the re-raffled MeTC branch, Co filed a “Motion for Permanent Dismissal,” which the court granted. Uy then filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, which annulled the MeTC’s orders and directed the trial to proceed. Co’s subsequent petition to the Court of Appeals was dismissed, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

1. Whether the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases on the ground of denial of the right to speedy trial constitutes a final dismissal.
2. Whether the MeTC acted with jurisdiction in reviving the criminal cases.
3. Assuming the dismissal was provisional: a) whether the one-year time bar for revival is computed from the issuance of the order; b) whether the actual number of days in a year is the basis for computing the one-year period; and c) whether the filing of a motion to revive automatically revives the cases.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. First, the issues raised were already subject to a final and executory dismissal in G.R. No. 171096, constituting res judicata. On the merits, Co’s claim of a violated right to speedy trial was baseless, as he failed to prove the delay was vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or attended by malice. The Court emphasized that speedy trial is a flexible concept evaluated by balancing factors like the delay’s duration, reason, assertion of the right, and prejudice. Second, the provisional dismissal did not meet all essential requisites under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the time-bar to apply, particularly the requirement that the offended party be notified of the motion for provisional dismissal at least three days before the hearing. Here, Co moved for dismissal only in open court, without prior notice to Uy. Third, the one-year period to revive a provisionally dismissed case runs from notice to the offended party of the order of dismissal, not from its issuance. Since Uy received notice on July 2, 2003, the motion to revive filed on July 2, 2004 was timely. The Court rejected Co’s argument that the motion was one day late due to 2004 being a leap year, stating that the period is computed based on the anniversary date of notice, not the actual number of days. Finally, revival is not automatic upon filing a motion; it requires a court order granting the revival.