G.R. No. 16254 ; February 21, 1922
G.A. CUUNJIENG, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRED L. PATSTONE, engineer of the city of Manila, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Plaintiff G.A. Cuunjieng desired to erect a warehouse on Azcarraga Street in Manila. The City Engineer, Fred L. Patstone, denied his application for a building permit because Cuunjieng refused to comply with Ordinance No. 301. The ordinance required property owners on designated principal streets, including Azcarraga, to: (1) construct an arcade over the sidewalk in front of their building, and (2) pay a license fee equal to one-half of the assessed value of the city land to be occupied by the arcade. Cuunjieng refused, arguing the arcade was unnecessary for his warehouse and that the ordinance, in exacting such a fee, was beyond the Municipal Board’s legislative powers and unconstitutional. He filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of the permit.

ISSUE

1. May the constitutionality of a city ordinance be raised in mandamus proceedings by the petitioner?
2. Does the City of Manila, under its charter, have the power to require, as a prerequisite for a building permit, the payment of a fee equal to one-half of the assessed value of the city land to be covered by an arcade?

RULING

1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings. The rule is different when the respondent official raises unconstitutionality as a defense; in such cases, courts generally decline to consider it to avoid hindering public business. Since the petitioner attacked the ordinance’s validity and had no other adequate remedy, the action was properly brought.
2. No. The Court ruled that the charge imposed by Ordinance No. 301 was neither a valid tax nor a license fee. Legislative powers regarding taxes and licenses are delegated and must be strictly construed. The fee was not a tax for revenue purposes, nor was it a regulatory license fee reasonably related to the cost of supervision. Instead, it was essentially a charge for the exclusive use of a portion of the public sidewalk. The city charter did not grant the Municipal Board the power to compel property owners to lease portions of public sidewalks or to exact such a charge as a condition for a building permit. Therefore, the ordinance was ultra vires and invalid. The writ of mandamus was granted, and the City Engineer was ordered to issue the building permit without requiring compliance with the invalid provisions of Ordinance No. 301.