GR 146161; (July, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 146161 ; July 17, 2006
PEPITO CAPILA Y YRUMA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Pepito Capila, a security guard, was charged with robbery for the holdup of a Meralco collection office in Makati on August 9, 1993, where over P1.2 million in cash and three firearms were taken. The prosecution presented evidence that two armed men entered the office, subdued the guard on duty, Dimas dela Cruz, and ordered the bank employees to lie face down before taking the money and guns. After the incident, dela Cruz identified petitioner, his fellow security guard, as one of the robbers to the responding police officer, SPO4 Romualdo Maximo, and to his agency’s intelligence officer. Petitioner fled to Northern Samar, where he was later arrested and allegedly found with part of the loot. During trial, the accused, including petitioner, waived their right to present evidence after their demurrer was denied.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the trial court erred in convicting petitioner based largely on the out-of-court statement of his co-accused, Dimas dela Cruz, identifying him as a perpetrator, despite dela Cruz not testifying in court, thereby allegedly violating petitioner’s right to confrontation and cross-examination.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The statement of Dimas dela Cruz, made immediately after the robbery to the investigating officer, is admissible as part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. For a declaration to be considered part of the res gestae, it must be spontaneous, made contemporaneously with the startling occurrence, and before the declarant had time to contrive or devise. Here, dela Cruz’s identification of petitioner was made promptly to the first police responder at the crime scene, satisfying these requirements. It was a natural reaction to a startling event and thus an exception to the hearsay rule. Furthermore, petitioner’s conduct militated against his innocence. His flight to Samar after the incident is indicative of guilt. His waiver of the right to present evidence and failure to rebut the prosecution’s case constituted an admission by silence under Section 32, Rule 130, as the damaging testimonies naturally called for a response if untrue. The totality of evidence established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.