G.R. No. 141528 ; October 31, 2006
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Oscar P. Mallion initially filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied this petition for failure to present preponderant evidence, and the denial became final after the dismissal of his appeal for non-payment of fees. Subsequently, after the first case attained finality, Mallion filed a second petition for nullity, this time alleging that the marriage was void due to the absence of a valid marriage license.
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the second petition on the grounds of res judicata and forum shopping. The RTC granted the motion, dismissing the case for forum shopping and multiplicity of suits. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for review, wherein he argues that the two petitions involve distinct causes of action—psychological incapacity versus absence of a license—and thus, res judicata should not apply.

ISSUE

Does a final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of a marriage license?

RULING

Yes, the subsequent petition is barred. The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the application of res judicata under the concept of “conclusiveness of judgment.” While the two petitions are based on different grounds, they share an identity of parties, subject matter, and relief sought—the declaration of nullity of the same marriage. The Court emphasized the principle against splitting a cause of action. A cause of action comprises the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. Here, the primary right involved is the status of the marriage, and the violation is its alleged invalidity. Petitioner, in seeking to nullify the marriage, was obligated to assert all available grounds in a single proceeding.
By initially litigating the marriage’s validity on psychological incapacity and impliedly conceding the regularity of the marriage ceremony, petitioner is deemed to have waived any other defects, such as the lack of a license. Allowing successive suits on different grounds for the same objective would violate public policy aimed at ending litigation and would constitute vexatious multiplicity of suits. Therefore, the final judgment in the first case bars the second petition. The trial court correctly dismissed the case.