G.R. No. 138955 October 29, 2002
AMPARO ROXAS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and MANOTOK REALTY, INC., respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Manotok Realty, Inc., the registered owner of a subdivision lot, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner Amparo Roxas before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Marikina. Manotok alleged that it entered into a Contract to Sell with Roxas over the lot on September 18, 1961, but notarially rescinded the contract on September 14, 1973, due to Roxas’s failure to pay the stipulated monthly installments. Despite notice of cancellation and subsequent demands to vacate, Roxas remained in possession. A final demand to vacate was made on August 3, 1995. Roxas, in her answer, denied the allegations, claimed she complied with the contract, and asserted bad faith on Manotok’s part. The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ruling it was an accion publiciana because the cause of action was based on tolerance. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MeTC, holding the complaint was one for unlawful detainer and ordering Roxas to vacate and pay compensation and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. Roxas then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the dispute, being between a subdivision developer and a lot buyer, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

ISSUE

1. Whether petitioner could still raise the issue of jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings.
2. Whether the instant case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
1. On the first issue, the Court held that petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction. While she raised the failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the HLURB in her MeTC position paper, this was not an explicit attack on the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter. After obtaining a favorable judgment from the MeTC (which dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds but for accion publiciana, not HLURB jurisdiction), she abandoned any theory of HLURB jurisdiction. She consistently adopted the MeTC’s ruling that the action was for accion publiciana in her pleadings before the RTC and CA. It was only in her petition to the Supreme Court that she squarely asserted HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction for the first time. The general rule that jurisdiction may be raised at any time yields when its application would contravene fair play, as a party cannot change his theory on appeal after the case was tried and decided upon a different theory below.
2. On the second issue, the Court ruled that the case does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. The complaint was one for unlawful detainer, based on the allegation that Roxas’s possession became illegal upon her refusal to vacate after the lawful cancellation of the Contract to Sell and subsequent demand. The cause of action was for ejectment based on the termination of her right to possess under the contract, not for specific performance or rescission of the contract itself. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. The complaint sufficiently described a cause of action for unlawful detainer, as Roxas’s initial possession was lawful by virtue of the contract, but became unlawful upon her failure to vacate after demand following the contract’s cancellation. Therefore, the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction. The summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against a person who occupies the land at the owner’s tolerance or permission and fails to vacate upon demand.