G.R. No. 131035 ; February 28, 2003
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Salvador de la Cruz, accused-appellant.

FACTS

On April 5, 1991, at midnight, Florencio Antonio was chased and stabbed to death by three assailants, including Salvador de la Cruz, known as “Bading,” in Tondo, Manila. Eyewitnesses Ferdinand Peñaranda and Danilo Laviña saw the incident under a Meralco lamp post. Peñaranda saw Florencio trip and fall, after which Tamano stabbed him first, followed by de la Cruz and another known as Boy Negro. Laviña, who rushed from a nearby billiard hall, corroborated the stabbing. The victim died from multiple stab wounds. The initial police report listed the suspects as “Tamano,” “Boy Negro,” and “Bading” de la Cruz.
Salvador de la Cruz was later arrested for a separate theft charge in July 1991. While in custody, eyewitnesses Peñaranda and Laviña positively identified him as “Bading,” one of the assailants. An Information for Murder was filed against de la Cruz, alleging conspiracy, evident premeditation, and treachery. He pleaded not guilty. The trial court convicted him of Murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. De la Cruz appealed, arguing the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were not established.

ISSUE

Whether the accused-appellant, Salvador de la Cruz, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, or if the crime committed is Homicide due to the absence of qualifying circumstances.

RULING

The Supreme Court modified the trial court’s decision, convicting accused-appellant of Homicide, not Murder. The Court affirmed the factual findings of the trial court regarding the positive identification of de la Cruz by two credible eyewitnesses, which was consistent and remained unshaken despite cross-examination. Their testimonies established that de la Cruz was one of the individuals who stabbed the victim, proving his criminal liability.
However, the Court ruled that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. For treachery to qualify the killing to murder, the prosecution must prove that the means of execution were deliberately adopted to ensure the attack without risk to the assailant. The evidence showed the attack began with a chase; the victim was fleeing and was stabbed only after he tripped and fell. The mode of attack was not shown to have been consciously adopted to render the victim defenseless from the very beginning. Evident premeditation was also not established, as there was no proof of the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, an act manifestly indicating persistence, or a sufficient lapse of time between the resolution and execution to reflect upon the consequences. Consequently, without these qualifying circumstances, the crime is Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty was modified to an indeterminate sentence of 9 years and 4 months of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of civil indemnity, moral, and actual damages to the victim’s heirs was sustained.