GR 130026; (May, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 130026 . May 31, 2000.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Antonio Magat was charged with two counts of rape committed against his daughter, Ann Fideli Magat. Upon arraignment, he initially pleaded guilty and, with the conformity of the public prosecutor and the private complainant’s mother, entered into a plea bargain for a lesser penalty. The trial court, in an Order dated January 10, 1997, sentenced him to ten years imprisonment for each case. Three months later, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant, who found the penalty too light. Accused-appellant was re-arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and trial ensued. Subsequently, on July 3, 1997, he changed his plea back to guilty. The trial court, after conducting a searching inquiry, accepted the plea, took the complainant’s testimony, and rendered a joint decision sentencing him to death for each count and ordering him to pay damages.
ISSUE
Whether the re-arraignment and subsequent trial of accused-appellant violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
RULING
No, double jeopardy did not attach. The Supreme Court held that the initial conviction based on the January 10, 1997 Order was void ab initio. The plea bargaining was invalid as accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the offense charged but merely bargained for a lesser penalty, which is not the plea bargaining contemplated by law. Under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, plea bargaining is allowed only when the accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense, not merely to a lesser penalty for the same offense. Since the plea was not to a lesser offense, the court’s acceptance and the resulting sentence were void. A void judgment does not become final and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. Consequently, the court acted correctly in setting aside the void order, re-arraigning the accused, and proceeding with the trial. The subsequent conviction and imposition of the penalty of death (later reduced to reclusion perpetua by the Supreme Court in line with prevailing jurisprudence) were therefore valid.