GR 113725; (June, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 113725 ; June 29, 2000
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLLUELA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
FACTS
The testatrix, Aleja Belleza, instituted Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee of a parcel of land in her duly probated Codicil. The Codicil imposed the condition that Dr. Rabadilla, and subsequently his heirs, must deliver 100 piculs of sugar annually to respondent Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos. It further stipulated that if the property were sold, leased, or mortgaged to anyone other than the testatrix’s near descendants or sister, or if the obligation to deliver sugar were violated, the respondent could seize the property and reconvey it to the testatrix’s heirs.
Upon Dr. Rabadilla’s death, the property passed to his heirs, including petitioner Johnny Rabadilla. The respondent filed a complaint alleging violations: the heirs mortgaged the property to banks (not the designated relatives) and failed to deliver the sugar annuity from 1985. The petitioner argued that a subsequent amicable settlement with the respondent, executed by his lessee and attorney-in-fact, modified the obligation and constituted substantial compliance.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner, as an heir of the instituted devisee, violated the conditions of the Codicil, warranting the enforcement of its penal clause for reconveyance of the property.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision ordering reconveyance. The legal logic is anchored on the mandatory and solemn nature of testamentary dispositions. A will is a personal and revocable act that takes effect upon death, and the testator’s wishes, as clearly expressed in the Codicil, must be strictly followed. The conditions imposed—to deliver sugar and to restrict alienation—were positive and suspensive obligations attached to the devise.
The petitioner’s violations were clear: the mortgages to banks breached the specific prohibition against alienating to non-relatives, and the failure to deliver the sugar constituted a direct breach of the principal obligation. The subsequent amicable settlement could not novate or compromise the testamentary condition. The law does not allow a will, which takes effect only after death, to be the subject of a compromise agreement that would alter the testator’s unequivocal commands. The settlement was a personal arrangement that did not relieve the heir of the conditional obligation imposed by the Codicil itself. Therefore, the breach triggered the penal clause, justifying the ordered reconveyance of the property to the estate of the testatrix.