G.R. No. 111168 June 17, 1998
JOAQUIN E. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Joaquin E. David was convicted of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting Noel Nora (fatal) and Narciso Nora, Jr. (wounded) on March 28, 1981. The prosecution’s version was that after a verbal confrontation, petitioner retrieved a gun, shouted epithets, and fired at the victims as they walked home. The Regional Trial Court convicted petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed but modified the penalties, crediting the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Petitioner claimed self-defense, alleging the Nora brothers ganged up on him, with Noel stabbing his arm and others hitting him. He asserted he ran home, retrieved a gun, and fired only when the brothers advanced toward him despite warnings after they had hurled stones. He argued the courts erred in not appreciating self-defense, either complete or incomplete, and in not considering other mitigating circumstances.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating petitioner’s claim of self-defense and in not considering other mitigating circumstances.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the conviction but further modified the penalties and damages. The Court held that petitioner failed to prove the essential elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof shifts to the accused when self-defense is invoked, requiring proof of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. Petitioner’s claim of unlawful aggression from the initial alleged stabbing and beating was negated by his own actions; he admitted leaving the scene, entering his house to get a gun, and then going back outside to confront the victims. This sequence broke any continuing aggression. His act of firing at the retreating victims, who were across the street, demonstrated an absence of reasonable necessity for the means used.
The Court, however, found the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, and minority to be applicable. Petitioner was 17 years old at the time of the crime, entitling him to a privileged mitigating circumstance under the Child and Youth Welfare Code. With three mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances, the penalty for homicide was reduced by one degree from reclusion temporal to prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the final penalty was an indeterminate sentence of 6 months of arresto mayor to 6 years of prision correccional. For frustrated homicide, the penalty imposed was 6 months of arresto mayor. The awards for civil indemnity and damages were also adjusted to reflect only amounts supported by evidence.