GR 108532; (March, 1999) (Digest)
G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Abdon Gilig obtained a money judgment against Pablo Taneo in Civil Case No. 590. To satisfy the judgment, two of Taneo’s properties were levied and sold at a sheriff’s auction to Gilig on February 12, 1966. The properties were a five-hectare parcel of land and a house claimed as a family home. After the redemption period lapsed, a final deed of conveyance was issued to Gilig in 1968. In 1985, petitioners, as Taneo’s heirs, filed an action to annul the deed and quiet title. They argued the land, allegedly covered by a free patent, was inalienable under Commonwealth Act No. 141 , Section 118, and that the family home was exempt from execution.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring Gilig the absolute owner and ordering the cancellation of Taneo’s title. It found the land was originally private, purchased by Taneo in 1941, and only later fraudulently titled via free patent. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners elevated the case, reiterating the inalienability of the free patent land and the exemption of the family home.
ISSUE
The core issues are: (1) whether the sheriff’s sale of land acquired by free patent is prohibited under CA 141, Sec. 118; and (2) whether the subject family home is exempt from execution.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the lower courts. On the first issue, the Court ruled that Section 118 of CA 141, which prohibits the alienation or encumbrance of free patent land within five years, does not apply to sales by legal process or court order to satisfy a money judgment. The prohibition is a personal disqualification on the patentee, not an incapacity of the land itself. A sheriff’s sale pursuant to a final judgment is a forced sale sanctioned by law, not a voluntary alienation by the patentee. Since the execution sale occurred in 1966, well beyond any applicable five-year period from the patent’s issuance, the conveyance was valid.
On the second issue, the Court found the family home exemption inapplicable. The house was extrajudicially constituted as a family home in 1964, but the instrument was registered only in 1966. The money judgment was rendered in 1964. Under Article 243 of the Civil Code, a family home is not exempt from execution for debts incurred before its declaration was recorded. The debt here preceded the registration. Furthermore, the constitution was defective as the house was built on land owned by another, not on land owned by the person constituting the family home, contrary to legal definition. Thus, the property was properly subject to execution.
