AM RTJ 99 1436; (September, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. RTJ-99-1436. September 30, 2004
ATTY. FIDELA Y. VARGAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Atty. Fidela Y. Vargas, a lawyer, acted as “special counsel” for accused-detainees in several criminal cases pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo City, presided by respondent Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala. In 1996, respondent was designated as an assisting judge in Quezon City. In 1997, complainant wrote to the Chief Justice and the Court Administrator about the delayed hearings in Branch 74 and even filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent’s recall to Olongapo. Respondent reassumed her post in Olongapo in February 1998, harboring resentment as she believed complainant was instrumental in her recall, which deprived her of the convenience of working in Quezon City, her residence.
Respondent subsequently inhibited herself from a civil case where complainant was a party, explicitly citing prejudice due to complainant’s actions. When complainant later entered her appearance as “special counsel” in the criminal cases without the conformity of the existing PAO counsel de oficio, respondent issued orders rejecting these appearances, requiring prior confirmation from the counsel on record. In retaliation, complainant filed an administrative case accusing respondent of, among others, gross ignorance of the law for refusing her appearances, dereliction of duty for an alleged reduced work schedule, and posting a defamatory newspaper clipping on the courtroom door.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala is administratively liable for the charges of gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty, and conduct prejudicial to the service.
RULING
No, the respondent judge is not administratively liable. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, agreeing with the findings of the Investigating Justice that the charges were unsubstantiated. On the charge of gross ignorance for refusing complainant’s “special appearance,” the Court upheld the respondent’s actions. A “special counsel” cannot simply supplant a duly appointed counsel de oficio from the PAO without proper substitution or collaboration, which requires the consent of the original counsel to ensure orderly proceedings and protect the accused’s right to consistent representation. Respondent’s orders demanding confirmation were a valid exercise of judicial discretion to uphold procedural rules, not ignorance of the law.
Regarding dereliction of duty for allegedly working only three days a week, the Court found the charge baseless. The official calendar and logbooks presented by respondent proved she maintained a regular schedule, and complainant failed to provide credible evidence to the contrary. Finally, on the charge of posting a defamatory news clipping, the Court found no evidence linking respondent to the act. Complainant’s claim was speculative, and there was no proof respondent posted the clipping or was the source of the published statements. The Court concluded that the administrative complaint arose from the personal animosity between the parties, and the complainant failed to discharge her burden of proving the allegations by substantial evidence.
