G.R. No. A.M. No. P-12-3058; April 25, 2012
LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. GEORGE E. GAREZA, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Victorias City, Negros Occidental, Respondent.

FACTS

The Leave Division of the Office of the Court Administrator reported that respondent George E. Gareza, a Sheriff III, incurred habitual tardiness on multiple occasions from January 2009 to January 2010. The specific instances included being tardy 12 times in January 2009, 10 times in April 2009, 10 times in June 2009, 12 times in October 2009, 14 times in November 2009, and 15 times in January 2010. The Court Administrator required Gareza to comment on the report.
In his comment, Gareza did not deny the charges and apologized for his infractions. He attributed his tardiness to his transfer of residence, which resulted in a longer commute to work, and pleaded for another chance to correct his errors. The OCA noted that Gareza had a prior administrative offense, having been reprimanded for habitual tardiness in a Minute Resolution dated December 12, 2010, in Administrative Matter No. P-10-2876, making the present case his second offense.

ISSUE

Whether respondent George E. Gareza is administratively liable for habitual tardiness, and if so, what is the appropriate penalty given that this is his second offense.

RULING

Yes, the respondent is administratively liable. The Supreme Court adopted the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator. The legal logic is anchored on the application of the Civil Service Commission’s uniform rules on administrative offenses. Under Section 52(C)(4), Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, the prescribed penalties for habitual tardiness are: reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one to thirty days for the second offense, and dismissal for the third offense.
The Court found the charges substantiated as Gareza himself admitted to the tardiness. His excuse of a longer commute due to a change of residence was not considered a valid justification to exempt him from administrative sanction. Since it was established that he had already been reprimanded for a prior identical offense, the present case constituted a second offense. Consequently, applying the CSC rules, the penalty of suspension for thirty days was deemed appropriate. The Court imposed this penalty with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act would be met with a more severe penalty, underscoring the imperative for court personnel to adhere strictly to official time as part of their duty to uphold public accountability and efficiency in the judiciary.