AM MTJ 981147; (July, 1998) (Digest)
G.R. No. MTJ-981147 July 2, 1998
Jesus S. Conducto, complainant, vs. Judge Iluminado C. Monzon, respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Jesus S. Conducto charged respondent Judge Iluminado C. Monzon of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Pablo City, with ignorance of law. The charge stemmed from the judge’s refusal to suspend a barangay chairman, Benjamin Maghirang, who was charged before his court with unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution filed a motion for Maghirang’s suspension pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). In his Order of 30 June 1995, respondent judge denied the motion, reasoning that the offense was committed during Maghirang’s previous term (1989-1994) and that Maghirang had been re-elected in 1994. The judge cited jurisprudence stating that a public official cannot be removed for acts done prior to his present term. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that suspension under R.A. No. 3019 is a preventive, procedural measure distinct from removal as an administrative penalty, and that re-election obliterates administrative but not criminal liabilities. Respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration in his Order of 3 August 1995, reiterating his position and adding that preventive suspension is applicable only if there is also an administrative case filed against the official. Complainant then requested the judge to inhibit, which he did voluntarily. The case was subsequently assigned to another judge.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Judge Iluminado C. Monzon is administratively liable for ignorance of the law for denying the motion to suspend the accused barangay chairman under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 , based on his erroneous interpretation that suspension could not apply due to the accused’s re-election and the absence of a concurrent administrative case.
RULING
Yes, respondent Judge is administratively liable for incompetence as a result of ignorance of a settled doctrine. The Supreme Court found that the judge’s ruling was contrary to established jurisprudence. The Court clarified that Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 mandates the suspension of an incumbent public officer against whom a valid information for offenses under the Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (which includes Article 244 on Unlawful Appointment) is pending. This suspension is a preventive measure, not a penalty, and is intended to prevent the accused from using his office to influence the proceedings or intimidate witnesses. The Court emphasized that the rule that re-election condones administrative offenses does not apply to criminal prosecutions; a public official can be prosecuted and, under R.A. No. 3019 , suspended pending trial for crimes committed during a prior term. The judge’s additional claim that suspension required a pending administrative case was also found to be without legal basis. By disregarding this settled doctrine, respondent Judge violated Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which requires a judge to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law. The Court imposed a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
