AC 7549; (August, 2008) (Digest)
Adm. Case No. 7549 ; August 29, 2008
Aurelio M. Sierra, complainant, vs. Jhosep Y. Lopez, City Prosecutor of Manila, Eufrocino Sulla, Alexander T. Yap, Marlo Campanilla, and Armando Velasco, respondents.
FACTS
Complainant Aurelio M. Sierra filed several criminal cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. During the preliminary investigation, the principal respondents submitted their counter-affidavits without being physically present simultaneously with the complainant. Some affidavits were subscribed before the assigned prosecutor ahead of schedule, while others were sworn before a prosecutor in a different city. Sierra objected to this procedure, arguing it denied him a confrontation. He successively requested the inhibition of three Assistant City Prosecutors (Yap, Campanilla, and Velasco) for handling the cases in this manner, but City Prosecutor Lopez and First Assistant Prosecutor Sulla affirmed their subordinates’ actions.
Sierra subsequently filed this administrative complaint for dereliction of duty and gross ignorance of the law. He specifically questioned whether the rules require the parties’ simultaneous appearance before the investigating prosecutor, mandate that counter-affidavits be sworn only before the assigned prosecutor, and obligate the prosecutor to grant a request for clarificatory questioning.
ISSUE
Whether the respondents committed dereliction of duty or gross ignorance of the law in their conduct of the preliminary investigation.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court clarified the procedure under Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. The legal logic is threefold. First, the rules do not require a confrontation or simultaneous appearance of the parties during preliminary investigation. The process is ordinarily conducted through the exchange of pleadings, affidavits, and documents. The Court cited precedent stating that the validity of the proceedings is not conditioned on the accused’s physical presence, as long as they are given an opportunity to contest the evidence, preventing dilatory tactics.
Second, there is no requirement that counter-affidavits must be sworn to exclusively before the investigating prosecutor assigned to the case. Rule 112, Section 3(a) explicitly permits affidavits to be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or authorized government official. Therefore, the respondents’ acceptance of counter-affidavits sworn before another prosecutor was procedurally correct.
Third, the decision to conduct clarificatory questioning is discretionary on the part of the investigating prosecutor under Section 3(e). It is not a mandatory step that can be demanded by a party. Consequently, the prosecutors’ denial of Sierra’s request for such questioning did not constitute an abuse of discretion, dereliction, or ignorance of the law. The respondents handled the preliminary investigation in accordance with established rules.
