GR 174689; (October, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, registered male at birth, underwent sex reassignment surgery in Thailand in 2001. Alleging he was a male transsexual who had always identified as female, he filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to change his first name from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from “male” to “female” in his birth certificate. The RTC granted the petition, finding it equitable and noting no opposition was interposed by the State. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed via certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that no law permits the alteration of entries in a birth certificate on the ground of sex reassignment. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this appeal to the Supreme Court. Petitioner argued the changes were allowable under the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court, and Republic Act No. 9048 .
ISSUE
May a person who has undergone sex reassignment surgery successfully petition for a change of name and the sex entry in the birth certificate to reflect the result of such surgery?
RULING
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision. On the change of name, the Court held that a change of name is a privilege governed by statute. While Republic Act No. 9048 allows correction of clerical errors, a change grounded on sex reassignment is a substantial alteration for which there is no legal basis. The State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the consistency and integrity of civil registry records for identification.
On the change of sex, the Court ruled that Philippine laws do not recognize sex reassignment surgery as a ground for altering a person’s legal sex. The entries in a birth certificate, which record facts at the time of birth, are historical in nature. Sex is determined at birth based on biological genitalia, not on subsequent surgical or psychological interventions. The Court emphasized that statutes pertaining to marriage, family relations, and specific crimes are premised on a clear biological differentiation between male and female. Allowing such a change would have profound legal implications on these settled areas of law. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of legal merit.